Thai Politics and Foreign Aid in rural Isan development and Modernization in 1990's. By Char Karnchanapee. PhD.( Pol.Sci.) A. Geographical Setting, Thai Politics and Historical Background 1. Geographical Setting The Royal Kingdom of Thailand, previously known as Siam,1 is a key country on the mainland of Southeast Asia. It is estimated that it has an area of approximately 200,000 square miles, which makes it about the size of Texas. Thailand shares boundaries with Burma on the west and north, Laos on the east and Malaysia on the south. The Gulf of Thailand lies to the south. Thailand is divided into four major geographic regions: the Central, North, South and Northeast. The main feature of the Northeast region, which we are chiefly concerned with here, is a large plateau which rises about 1,000 feet above the Central plains. It covers about one third of the country. Droughts in the dry season and floods in the wet season cause poverty in this region. Irrigation and flood control projects on the Mekong River may help to bring a better agricultural life to the region. Thai society is mostly rural in nature. The resources come largely from the valleys and plains of the North, Northeast, South and Central regions. The religion of Thailand is Buddhism of the Theravad branch. More than ninety percent of the people are Buddhist. Religious freedom, however, exists in the country.1 2. Thai Politics and Historical Background Thai history began when certain people began to migrate southward from southern China between the seventh and thirteenth centuries. At that time, Southern China was still occupied by the Mongols under Kublai Khan's rule. In the thirteenth century Thailand developed a kingdom, the capital of which was at Sukothai in the north. Around the middle of the fourteenth century, the capital was moved to Ayuthaya on the right bank of the Chao Phraya River, not far from Bangkok. For the first time Thai had some contacts with the Western countries; first with Portugal, then France, and also with other Southeast Asian countries. Ayuthaya existed until the end of the eighteenth century. In 1768, Burmese troops from the west completely destroyed Ayuthaya. Later, General Phraya Taksin was able to reorganize the Thai troops and push the Burmese out of the country. He established a new capital on the right bank of the Chao Phraya River, a few miles north of the Gulf of Siam. In 1782, the new Chakkri dynasty was founded by King Rama I. He moved the capital across the river to its present location at Bangkok. Thai relations with both neighbors and western countries became increasingly fruitful. However, when Indochina was overrun by the French and Burma was occupied by the British in the late nineteenth century, Thailand faced the threat of coming under the domination of these European powers.2 But Thailand was able to thwart these European pressures through a number of steps. One of these involved the modernization of the kingdom. This modernization effort began with the reign of King Mongkut in 1851. King Mongkut (King Rama IV) concentrated on the modernization and westernization of the nation. He and his successors (King Chulalongkorn, Rama V, and King Wachirawood, Rama VI) saw the challenge facing Thailand. Under King Rama IV (1851-1868), Thailand began adjusting itself to the world as governed by the Western powers. Thailand managed to avoid becoming a colony of the West by modernizing its education, by making trade agreements with the West, and by playing France off against Great Britain. This trend was continued by King Rama V, or King Chulalongkorn (1866-1910), who was responsible for introducing the liberal spirit of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. When he began his regime, Thailand was a typical Southeastern Asian country with a heavy-handed bureaucracy and many feudal patterns. At his death, Thailand was a financially secure state with a developing communications system and the beginning of an effective army and administration. His greatest contribution was to abolish slavery in Thailand.3 Under King Rama VI (1910-1925), the Thai were introduced to more of the social customs of the West. The intelligentsia developed a sense of nationalism under his leadership. Also, codification of the laws was begun during his regime. Thailand took the side of the Allies during the First World War and sent expeditionary forces and a small flying corps to France. As a result, Thailand has a position from which to negotiate during the Versailles Conference. With that as a basis, by 1925 Thailand had signed new treaties with all the powers that were involved. The treaties set a date for the termination of all legal and fiscal limitations which the European powers had sought to impose on Thailand.4 3. Present Thai Government and Politics King Prachathipok (King Rama VII), King Rama VI's successor and brother, was not as forceful or strong-willed as his older brother. Policy during his regime was almost entirely determined by the group of the princes advising the monarch. It has been said that he wanted to give his country a constitution, but his advisors prevented him from doing so. Several factors, however, now indicated that a greater change might be coming. Among them were a decrease in the psychological strength of the monarchy, the development of confidence and professional skill among the military officers, financial difficulties and the resentment by the military of the king's private army.5 On June 24, 1932, a revolutionary group delivered an ultimatum to the king. Calling themselves the People's Party, the group, composed of military and civil officers, demanded that the king accept a constitution or be replaced by another prince. The leader of this group was Dr. Pridi Phanomyong, a young lawyer who had studied law in Paris. Though only thirty years old at the time, Pridi was regarded as the brains behind the coup. Colonel Phahon Phol Payuhasena led the conservative element of the party consisting of Army and Navy officers. The king yielded to this group, and the day of the absolute monarchy were over. Thailand was to seek its future in constitutional government presided over by a nominal monarch. In 1933, Colonel Phahon led his conservatives in a coup against the Royalists and was elected Prime Minister. In 1938, Phibun, Colonel Phahon's protege, became Prime Minister. During World War II, the Phibun government made an alliance with Japan. But Pridi, working with the United States Office of Strategic Services (OSS), led the Free Thai Movement. This group supplied and trained some 30,000 men who were prepared to invade Japan whenever the United States gave the word.6 As a result of Phibun's unpopular alliance with Japan, Pridi was able to speed the downfall of the Phibun government and to install Nai Khaung Apaiwong as Prime Minister. In 1947, King Ananda Thamahidon (Rama VIII) died mysteriously (he had succeeded to the throne in 1935 when King Rama VII abdicated) while Pridi was the Prime Minister. In the tension that followed, Phibun again became Prime Minister. In February of 1949, Pridi's attempt at a coup d'etat was crushed by the Army. The last such coup took place in 1958 when Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat took power and announced the drafting of a new constitution more suitable for the Thai people.7 After Field Marshal Sarit's death in December 1963, the leadership of the ruling group passed to his Deputy Prime Minister, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn. He reiterated Field Marshal Sarit's assurances that elections to parliament would take place. In February 1969, the Constituent Assembly approved Thailand's present constitution, and it was promulgated by the King on June 20, 1968. A general election was held on February 10, 1968. It resulted in a victory for the forces of Field Marshal Thanom, who continued in office as Prime Minister. In 1973, when Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn resigned under the pressure of massive student demonstrations, Professor Sanya Thammasak, Thammasat University Rector was appointed as Interim Prime Minister. Thailand returned to a civilian government and in January 1975 had national general elections. M. L. Kukrit Pramoj, of the right wing of the Social Action Party (SAP) was elected Prime Minster. Later on, his brother M. L. Seni Pramoj replaced him but was ousted in 1976 by Admiral Sa-Ngad Chaloryu with the National Administrative Reform Council. The junta appointed Thanin Kraivichien, a Supreme Court justice, as new Premier and also appointed a 340 member National Assembly, 110 of them military officers. After three years of civilian government ended with a military coup on October 6, 1976 Thailand reverted to military rule. The military in 1977, ousted Thanin as "weak", replacing him with an army General, Kriangsak Chamanan. The later resigned from the Premiership in 1980. The National Assembly elected General Prem Tinsulanon Prime Minister. There were a few coups during his premiership. One occurred on April 3, 1981. It was a military coup against the Prem government, but it failed. A general election on April 18, 1983, resulted in a new coalition government being formed, with Prem continuing as Prime Minister. Another coup attempt on September 9, 1985, was crushed by loyal troops after 10 hours of fighting in Bangkok. Politically speaking, it should be noted that Thailand has been mainly ruled by the military since the 1932 coup, even though steady efforts for constitutional rule have been made. The basic ruling structure, however, remains remarkably stable under three major groups, the Army Generals, top bureaucrats (technocrats) and entrepreneurs (business-financial leaders). They are mutually supportive of each other and continue to dominate Thai politics. Since an abortive coup in September 9, 1985, General Prem, who has been in office since 1980, dissolved the Thai House of Representatives on April 29, 1988, apparently to avoid a non-confidence vote. He faced a national election on July 24, 1988.8 A national general election on July 24, 1988, won General Chatichai Choonhavan, a retired army major general and a wealthy businessman, head of Thai Nation Party the office of Prime Minister.9 His political party won most of the votes to have the Prime Minister directly elected rather than nominated. Under the current Thai constitution, however, after general elections, the major parties select a prime ministerial candidate, who does not have to be a member of Parliament. General Prem Tinsulnanonda, the former Prime Minister with the longest tenure in Thai political history turned down offers to return to his post for another term. B. The General Historical Background of Foreign Aid to Thailand 1. Various Kinds of Foreign Aid Foreign aid to Thailand is still playing an important role in the revival and strengthening of the region, and to Thailand a whole. The particular steps being taken by the Thai Government, in cooperation with foreign countries and the United Nations, are highly significant. Foreign countries such as the United States, Japan, Israel and several European countries have already indicated their intention to extend financial aid to Thailand. Receiving aid from foreign countries also implies accepting their influence because the giving countries would aid only those who are allied with them. Foreign aid is either from the Western bloc of the Communist bloc. This means the foreign aid recipient will become a country under Western or Communist influences, especially economic and military aid from major powers. Countries such as Thailand and the Philippines, who receive foreign aid from Western powers, will always ally with Western Camp. These two countries have become defenders of the United States and opponents of the Communist countries since World War II ended. Thailand has been one of the staunchest allies of the United States in Southeast Asia for years.10 Subsequently U.S. aid has been one of the principal means by which the United States has sought direct influence in friendly countries. However, U.S. aid is not the only source of foreign aid to Thailand. Great Britain, Germany, Denmark, Australia, Japan, other Western countries and International Organizations are other sources. However, in longevity and total terms, the U.S. effort has been outstanding. The United States has been assisting Thailand since 1951. United States aid has come through two major channels; 1. Military Aid by way of M.A.P. (Military Assistance Program) which is administered by the department of Defense and implemented in Thailand through the JUSMAG (Joint United States Military Assistance Group). 2. Economic Aid which is administered by the A.I.D. (the Agency for International Development) and its predecessors, and implemented by the USOM (The United States Operation Mission).11 In regard to matters of implementing projects the Thai government is faced with difficult decisions of money and personnel. It is, however, necessary to consider some of the positive effects of foreign assistance for defense against external invasion and the promotion of internal security and economic growth. It is, furthermore, a basic substantive element in the closed alliance between the two countries. Economic assistance has been extended in a number of fields, including education, power, health, highway construction, agricultural diversification, and improvement of government services, particularly in rural areas. In addition to U.S. grant and loan assistance, the present health of the Thai economy has enabled the country to depend increasingly upon international lending institutions for the foreign capital needed for economic development projects. Military aid consists of military hardware, essential military supplies, and assistance in the construction and improvement of key military facilities and installations. United States personnel in Thailand oversee the delivery of equipment to the Thai Armed Forces and the training of Thai military personnel in the use and maintenance of the equipment.12 3. Other Aid Today, interest in Southeast Asia is at a high point. It seems likely that in the 1980's this interest will still grow and change significantly. It has now become clear that recent developments in Southeast Asia have increased the threat to Thai security from Communist-led subversion. In the Northeast region, a center of this study, the country's most important region, Communist infiltration and subversion have already begun. To meet this challenge quickly and effectively requires an accelerated program of economic and social development as well as improvement of Thai security forces. The Thai Government has undertaken a far-reaching program designed to reduce these vulnerabilities of the Northeast, and American military and economic grant assistance programs are aimed primarily at assisting the Thai Government in this essential security effort. Chapter II The Northeastern Region and Its Historical Setting A. Northeast Region Geographical Setting The Northeast Region, the center of the study, lies alone the border of Laos and Cambodia. With approximately 23 million people out of the total population of 52 million, it is the largest and most populous region in the country. It occupies an area of 62,000 square miles, which is one-third of the whole country. The population of this region is about two-fifths of the entire nation.13 The Northeast region is generally known as the Khorat Plateau, which got its name through the main city of the area, Nakornratchasima (Khorat). The Northeast, in comparison with the other regions, is desperately poor. Therefore, in the past, some believed that to be sent to the Northeast was like being punished and sent to the Siberia. These sixteen provinces were neglected by the central government for many decades. The entire area is drained by the Mekong River, which forms the Thai northeastern border for 600 miles, and other branches, such as the Moon and the Chi Rivers. The land is mostly low and covered with infertile soil difficult to cultivate. In the dry season, clouds of dust cover the whole area, which is flooded in the rainy season. The lowlands and the lower valley slopes remain unused most of the year due to the floods during the rainy seasons which makes them unusable even for rice paddy agriculture. Only a very small area of this land is used four or five months out of the year.14 The climate in the Northeast is quite different from that of the other regions. The mountain ranges keep the southwest monsoons away, but the Northeast still receives much rainfall from the cyclonic storms that originate in the area from the South China Sea. In the Northeast region the amount of rainfall varies from section to section; therefore, agriculture is unpredictable. It is hot and dry in the summer, but there is a cold northeast wind in the winter from Siberia and China. Besides rice, which is the main crop for this area, tobacco, mulberries, watermelons, and cotton are also farmed. The farmers also raise animals such as cattle, pigs, and chickens. B. The History of the Northeast Region For several centuries before Thai-speaking people began to arrive in the Northeast area, the Khorat Plateau was within the Angor Empire (khmer). After Thai-speaking people began to occupy the area, the Khmers started to feel their pressure.15 D.G.E. Hall, in his history of Southeast Asia, has written that . . . The shans, the Laotians and the Siamese are all descended from a parent racial group, cognate to the Chinese, which is thought to have made its first historical appearance in the sixth century B.C. . . .16 As has been mentioned, around the thirteenth century, the Thai-speaking people overcame a Khmer outpost and established the first capital of Thai autonomous state, Sukhothai, which had formerly been occupied by Mon and Khmers. Shortly afterwards, Sukhothai fell and two new capitals were established, Ayuthaya, the Siamese kingdom in the central region of the peninsula, and Lan Chang (or Lan-Xang) of Lao, in the mid-fourteenth century. Later the Lao kingdom expanded its territory over the northern part of Northeast Thailand and the Khmer empire continued to share the territory of the Northeast with the Laos. At this time in Thai history, Ayuthaya was not interested in the Northeast region.17 In 1350, one of the Laos' great kings, King Fa Ngum, married a Khmer princess after he was forced into exile in Cambodia. Later, he returned to unite Laos with the help of Khmer troops. King Fa Ngum was able to take over all the Khorat Plateau except some parts around Khorat city (or Nakhon Ratchasima) which were still in hostile hands.18 It was the first mass migration of Lao to the Northeast region. When King Fa Ngum established Laos, he also introduced Buddhism to the Lao people. However, Maha Sila Viravong said that the main reason that the Khmer supported King Fa Ngum was that the Khmer emperor wanted him to stop Thai's (Siamese) expansion.19 On the other hand, it was because of the weakness of the Khmer kingdom to protect itself against Ayuthaya that it gave military support to Lan Chang.20 Before the seventeenth century King Narai (1656-1688) ordered the two of Khmer towns of Muang Senao and Muang Khorabura to be outposts for Ayuthaya. These outposts were renamed Nakhon Ratchasima (or Khorat). This was the first clear evidence of Thai strength in the Northeast.21 To prevent confrontations between Ayuthaya and Lan Chang, the two kingdoms recognized the Khorat Plateau as a boundary region. A large number of Laotian migrated to the Northeast during King Fa Ngum's rein. Later on, a large number of Laotian people around Vientiane again moved into the area extensively from Roi-Ed to Champasak to escape one of the usurper kings of Lan Chang. Another migration to Kalasin took place later in the eighteenth century. The Lao brought with them both their own culture and languages. However, they also absorb some Khmer influence. This is seen today in the fact that a large number of Khmer-speaking people are still left in the Northeast at Surin, Buriram and some part of the Sisaket provinces. But significant as some of the Khmer influences were, the Northeast was becoming influenced even more by Laotian cultural, social and political ideas. Ayuthaya and even Chiang Mai, another autonomous state up north, shared with them the common enemy of the Burmese troops from the west. Prior to the beginning of the eighteenth century, after the reign of King Suriya Wongsa (1633-1690 or 1695), the Lao kingdom broke into three small kingdoms: Luang Prabang, Vientiane and Champasak. Ayuthaya now became more powerful. The Thai suddenly expanded their power into the Northeast much more than had been done previously. The Northeast area became a region of interest to at least three kingdoms: Ayuthaya, Champasak and Vientiane. Champasak was located on the left bank of the Mekong River, and her kingdom's territory lay in the area of the Mun (Moon) and Chi Rivers which today is in Roi-Ed, Ubon, and Kalasin provinces. This gradually disintegrated the Northeast into five small parts.22 The kingdoms of this region gradually broke up into smaller units. A new force, that of Burma, was now entering the scene. In 1767, Burmese troops from the west completely destroyed Ayuthaya, and Vientiane was forced to join Burma. Champasak, at the same time, attempted to expand it's territories into the Northeast. In due course, the Burmese occupiers met with increasing resistance, and under General Phraya Taksin's leadership they were able to reorganize their troops and drive the Burmese out of the country. In 1768 General Phraya Taksin, who was half Chinese and half Thai, established a new Thai capital at Thonburi and proclaimed himself the new king.23 Fortunately, Luang Prabang was saved because she aligned herself with the Thai kingdom. Afterwards, the three states of Vientiane, Luang Prabang and Champasak became Thai vassals. Since that time the Northeast, or Khorat Plateau, has remained an outer region within the Thai kingdom.24 In 1782 a new Chakkri dynasty, ruled by King Rama I, was established in the Thai kingdom. Thailand moved her new capital from Thonburi, which was on the left bank of the Chao Phraya River, to the present Bangkok location.25 In 1804, King Rama II of Bangkok placed Chao Anu of Vientiane, his personal friend, as the new king of Vientiane. In 1827, however, when King Rama III ascended to the throne, King Chao Anu of Vientiane attempted to regain the independence of Vientiane. With the combined support of two groups of vassal troops, King Chao Anu moved toward Bangkok for battle. He pretended that he was going to help Thailand, which was being threatened by British gunboats. The Laos troops were able to reach the area of Saraburi province in the Central plain of Thailand.26 At first the Thai troops were surprised, but quickly organized themselves to fight against the Laos troops. King Rama III ordered Vientiane completely destroyed, and deported some of the Laos people to the Central plains. To this day, these Laos-speaking groups still remain in the area of Lopburi and Ratchaburi provinces in the Central plain. Later on, King Chao Anu and his family were arrested, and for punishment were placed in an iron cage and subjected to public ridicule. They died four days later. At that time both Vientiane and Champasak were reduced in status and became vassals. Luang Prabang also remained a Thai vassal.27 But Thailand was to have its troubles not only from other aggressive Southeast Asian states or kingdoms. With the nineteenth century, strong, new pressures developed from the European colonial powers, notably the French and the British. The Franco-Siamese Treaty of 1893, signed under threat of a French ultimatum, allowed the French and British to expand their territorial influence into Southeast Asia, thus halting Thai expansion.28 It established the present borders of Thailand. This treaty also transferred the entire area on the left bank of the Mekong River, or what is Laos today, to France. Later, by the treaty of 1904, both the area on the right bank of the Mekong River, Sayaboury province (opposite Luang Prabang in Laos) and Champasak (it is also called Bassac by the French) were also ceded to France. Since that time the present borders between Laos and Thailand have remained unchanged.29 Chapter III The Northeast Region, the Thai Government and Foreign Aid A. The Northeast and the Development of Various Projects 1. A.R.D. (Accelerated Rural Development Program) The central government of Thailand was seeking in the sixties to help Northeast Thailand in order to better bind the region to the country. Among other things, an Accelerated Rural Development Program (A.R.D.) was instituted in 1964 to improve relations between the rural population and Bangkok, to increase rural income, and to strengthen local self-government, with the main concentration being in six of the sixteen Northeast provinces. The theory of the Accelerated Rural Development Program (A.R.D.) is that the Thai and American government will cooperate in making funds, personnel, and equipment available for swift initiation and completion of the coordinated projects designed to bring tangible results in clearly defined areas. The provincial governor is empowered to make decisions, to spend money, and to demand results. He does so in accordance with the expressed wishes of the local people and in cooperation with the other regional and local officials. The officials are expected to get together frequently with members of the community in order to determine their needs and to hear their comments. The program is thus relatively free from central bureaucracy; special personnel and equipment can be moved on to new projects as the early ones are completed, and the local population is expected to learn by doing and, hopefully, to grasp the significance of quickly and visibly improved living standards.30 Roads have been constructed to link the villages with main highways leading to the Central Plain area for economic communication and security reasons. Public health, welfare and educational efforts have been greatly expanded. Agricultural extension activities to enable the farmers to shift from subsistence rice cultivation to the raising of the other products more suited to regional soil and water conditions have begun. To bring those activities down to a self-help level, the provincial government officials have been given greater coordinating and executive authority, as well as additional staff, and equipment funds for such regional rural development efforts. Briefly, the Accelerated Rural Development Program (A.R.D.) was instituted in 1964 to improve the relationship between the rural populations and the Central population. It emphasized attempts to increase the rural people's income and to strengthen government in the provinces. 2. M.D.U. (Mobile Rural Development Units) This program has been established to meet immediate village needs through quick impact programs in the fields of health, education, public works and in the forms of community development. In addition, there are mobile information teams and new radio stations, which emphasize the virtues of an independent Thailand and the nature of the Communist threat. Buddhist monks have helped also; they travel from village to village teaching the villagers about Buddhist doctrines and simple current events in the town.31 Moreover, mobile medical teams, through the cooperation of A.R.D. and staffed by personnel drawn from the Thai medical profession, are treating about one million persons mainly in the Northeast and North. The United States supports the Ministry's training programs, which graduate about 1,000 rural health workers each year. Assistance is given to the Ministry's pilot project in protein nutrition and its family health program, which includes continuing research and plans to provide advice to approximately 4000,000 women by 1970.32 The military has also been involved in village-level development programs with Mobile Development Units (M.D.U.). Therefore, these units, composed of military personnel, doctors, government agents and, occasionally, an American observer or participant, go into villages in selected areas and couple medical treatment and economic development advice and examples with information about the government and about the objectives of Communism. These units have usually been located in the most sensitive areas of the Northeast. 3. Strengthening the Police: The Improvement of Village Security It is obvious that the villages in remote areas are among the Communist's main targets. Communist activities in remote, developing areas of Southeast Asia vary in degree from country to country, and even from one locality to another within the same country, but there is a fundamental pattern in their subversive and terroristic tactics which aims at creating armed conflict leading to an eventual Communist seizure of power. In order to reach the goal of an urgent protection against Communist threats and terrorism, the Bangkok government, with United States assistance, is increasing emphasis on the rural areas, and particularly upon the present generation of rural youths and young adults. Thus the effort has two basic objective: better protection for villagers against insurgent threats, and wider opportunities for villagers to improve their livelihood by increasing production.33 Under the United States assistance program, the United States Operations Mission (USOM) in Bangkok has supported the Thai government program to improve the Thai National Police Department (T.N.P.D.) in terms of security for the rural reasons. The T.N.P.D. is seeking to increase the number of police stations at the Tambol (a tambol is a Thai administrative unit composed of small villages up to ten). Its main purpose is an effective self-defense for local security. The T.N.P.D. is also carrying out, with other programs, road-construction, communication improvements, and education as well, aimed toward the general objective of strengthening the rural areas.34 To help reach its goal, the T.N.P.D., with United States assistance, has established the so-called "Chaiya Training Center" in Udorn province. It trains the police to man the tambol police stations in order to meet security needs. Close contact with the local people is also a fundamental requirement for better security in the up country. Through these improved police methods, it is hoped that the police may respond more quickly to requests for help from villages threatened by Communists. USOM assistance is providing the technical advice, communications equipment (e.g., radio sets, in order to communicate rapidly between villages and the security officials), weapons, vehicles, and even helicopters to improve T.N.P.D. mobility and its equipment. In 1969, approximately two thousand radios had been installed and were operating effectively. At Chaiya Training Center, Udorn, USOM has supported the T.N.P.D. program to expand its facilities for training recruits. The annual capacity had reached 12,000 in 1969.35 Besides its regular police duties, the Border Patrol Police, under the T.N.P.D., is carrying on its program of teaching of health services and other small scale development projects in the Northeast, aimed at improving security by developing closer contact with the rural people. USOM support to the T.N.P.D., providing better protection for the people in the rural area, accounted for over $19 million in the fiscal year 1967 (nearly forty percent of the total USOM program) and over $13 million (260 million baht) in the fiscal year 1968. The program, which is particularly focused in the Northeast, is Usom's main recipient.36 4. M.I.T. (Mobile Information Teams) and New Radio and Television In addition to the A.R.D., M.D.U., and T.N.P.D. programs, there are now information teams and new radio and television stations. They provide entertainment and also popular political education, emphasizing the virtues of independent Thailand and the nature of the Communist threat. The television station (Channel 55) in Khon-Kaen is an example of this new approach. The United States also helps this project by giving funds and creating a powerful new radio station to cover the whole area, which is called "The Free Asia." The government tends to believe that economic improvement cannot be implemented effectively without the securing of village loyalty. Therefore, it is necessary to increase the people's close feeling to Thailand and to the Thai government. To serve this purpose, the government has built both the radio and television stations in the Northeast which are located in the main Northeast provinces of Khon Kaen, Ubon, Udorn, Sakhon Nakhon, and Khorat. All these methods for making the Northeast populace more conscious of its sense off belonging to Thailand add to the traditional methods of education and local administration, which in the past contributed to the villagers' sense of belonging to Thailand.37 Much of the programming time on these radio and television stations is devoted to broadcasting traditional Northeastern music (in particular, folk opera known as Molum Moo, and folk songs or Molum Kan). Villagers hear that their own traditional culture is something which they share with other people. Radio commercials are also an important means of communication, for in contrast to news and feature programs which are broadcast in Thai, they are given in a standardized Northeastern dialect. Although villagers recognize that this dialect is slightly different from their own, they find it completely comprehensible in contrast to central or standard Thai. 5. Other Thai Government Projects Communist terrorist activity decreased in some areas in the Northeast as a direct result of the successful implementation of one or more of the various programs. This rendered them less vulnerable to Communist persuasion. But the Thai government continued to call for greater efforts on the part of all concerned. Emphasis was placed on two factors on which might well depend the success or failure of a counter insurgency and development project, namely the relationship between officials and villagers, and the participation of the villagers in their own affairs.38 One of the more striking consequences of aid to the Northeast has been the improvement of the region;s economic infrastructure. The completion of the Friendship Highway, which was built at a cost of $20 million (almost all from American sources), connected Bangkok with Khorat and finally with Nongkhai. Other less spectacular highways and communication connections have followed quite logically from the desire, expressed during King Chulalongkorn's reign, to reduce the isolation of the region from the Central Plains. The socio-economic structures and statistics which characterize the Thai Northeast must still be further improved if the material sources of discontent and alienation are to be eliminated. A rural income of the country, a greater discrepancy in income among farmers than elsewhere (the upper two percent receiving ten times more cash than the lowest seventy-five percent),and an estimated total annual per capita income in the lowest group of about $3039 pose serious problems for the country. The first major governmental programs for the development of the Northeast came during 1961-1962 when the government promulgated a five year plan for the development of the region with the following objectives: 1. to improve water control and supply 2. to improve means of the transport and communication 3. to assist villages in increasing production and marketing 4. to provide for regional industrial development and (later) rural electrification 5. to encourage private industrial and commercial development in the region 6. to promote community development, educational facilities, and public health programs at the local level.40 This plan, although by no means the first effort of the government of Thailand to deal with the problems of the Northeast, was the first government-sponsored plan designed specifically for the improvement of the region not subsumed in some larger national scheme. When the plan was first made public, the government announced that it would be sending about $300,000,000 on its implementation over the next five years (1962-1966). The money to finance such a large undertaking was to come, in great part, from United States aid grants.41 After the plan was first published in 1961, a Northeastern committee in the National Economic Development Board of the Prime Minister's Office, was charged with supervising, coordinating, or carrying out research in the Northeast region in order to bring the original proposals more in line with existing realities. The implementation of the program, however, has been divided between a large number of agencies, departments, and ministries with overall coordination supplied theoretically by the Ministry of National Development and the Prime Minister's Office. The United States Operations Mission to Thailand (part of the United States Agency for International Development) has devoted a large share of its resources to assist those Thai governmental bodies working on Northeastern development plans. However, these dual purpose programs were carried out by several agencies, some of which were specifically created for the purpose, including the National Security Command, the office of Accelerated Rural Development, the Communist Suppression Operation Command, the Department of Local Government, and Provincial and Border Patrol Police. All levels of the administrative system were involved, from governor to village headman, and in general there was a close cooperation between the military, civilian, and police arms in program implementation. By 1962 there were over 65,000 commercial vehicles in Thailand, 50,000 registered in places other than Bangkok. Although no specific figures for the Northeast are available, the Northeast must account for a sizable percentage of the commercial vehicles registered up country since much of the trade of the Central Plains is carried on by vehicles registered in Bangkok. These statistics contrast sharply with a pre-war (1939) total os 5,100 commercial vehicles which were most likely to have been located almost exclusively in Bangkok. In 1960 additional communication links were made possible through the inauguration of air service by the Thai Airways Corporation to several Northeastern towns. By 1963 there were regular flights between Bangkok and Nakhon Phanom, Udon, Khon Kaen and Ubon.42 The government, again using American aid funds, has begun the construction of irrigation and multi-purpose dams as part of the large international scheme for the eventual harnessing of the power of the Mekong River and its tributaries. The two most important dams being constructed at the moment are the multi-purpose Nam Pong Project in Khon Kaen, which is expected to provide both water control and electrical power for central provinces of the region, and the Lam Pao Project in Kalasin. Together they are designed to provide effective irrigation for most of the Chi River basin (this scheme covers the whole areas of Roi-Ed, Kalasin, and Ubol). B. The New Face of the Northeast Region Apart from a priority emphasis on the expansion of public health and education, a gradual modernization of the public administrative system, and a new security-conscious concern for the regional development and politicization of the Northeast, the government's programs offer general solid hope for the national future, provided that results can be obtained in time in the political, social, and cultural spheres of life. The National Economic Development Board produced during 1960 the country's first economic development plan, a broad six year program for the period 1961-1966, to be implemented in two stages. Subsequently, a second plan was created for the period 1967-1971. The primary objective of the first Thai plan was to raise the living standard by mobilization and utilizing both human and natural resources to achieve a high rate of economic growth.43 A visitor to the Northeast, Edward W. Mill, has pointed to some of the key disparities between the Northeast and other regions of Thailand. He wrote in an article in 1970: . . . One of the chief subjects of concern for the Thai government in recent years has been the economic and social disparities between the different regions of the country. Of special interest has been the Northeast region, traditionally an area of less economic opportunity. Where the per capita income for the central region is around $240 annually, for the Northeast it is only $70. Soil and water conditions, poor communications, and lack ofadequate roads have contributed to this picture. Moreover, education has been only minimal. It has been estimated that only 4.4% of the children of the high school age are in school; the majority of children spend not more than four years in village schools. This economic and social imbalance has made the region a prime target for Communist infiltration and propogranda.44 After noting these problems, Professor Mill also pointed out that . . . the government has organized a vast array of governmental activities designed to help the region. A comprehensive regional development plan, known as the National Economic Development Board (NEBD), has been worked out to coordinate efforts and achieve goals in this area. Working with the support of the United States Operations Mission (USOM), the Thai government is carrying out significant programs in rural development, road-building, communications improvements, and education, as well as generally expanding the range of government services for the Northeast. . . . Two years ago much of this governmental activity seemed to be largely on the paper. Today, there is concrete evidence of increasing accomplishment . . . long talks with the community development workers operating at the grass-roots, revealed a new sense of confidence and dedication to the tasks at hand.45 He continued: . . .Whatever the speculation may be, the Thai government is taking steps to be ready for almost any emergency. Evidence of this is to be seen in the new emergency preparedness program being planned by the NEDB and the National Security Council (N.S.C). This effort is designed to prepare the country for the mobilization of its national resources for future emergencies. It seeks to link together economic and military measures for national defense, with emphasis on the former. It reflects a desire on the part of the Thai to be ready for future emergencies.46 Some of the specific measures taken by the government include the completion of a new road from Roi-Ed to other districts, for example, Phon-thong, which opens up for more intensive development some 12,000 acres of land. This land is now under cultivation, mostly in rice. One of the prime means of the government is to persuade farmers to use chemical fertilizers which are now readily available on the market at reasonable prices. The agricultural officer posts big blue-and-white signs on those farm plots which are being fertilized, and the improved appearance and yield of the fields is thus brought to the attention of every passerby. The rice yield, at best, is, however, as yet, no more than about half that of the bountiful Central Plains, where the soil is richer and the rainfall more abundant, but progress is definitely being made. In addition to promoting the use of fertilizer, the government is encouraging the diversification of crops and the improvement of livestock. In this project area, special emphasis is placed upon the planting of tobacco and bananas, and upon introducing new strains of hogs and cattle. For those farmers who grow tobacco, the government provides the seed and buys the crop at fixed prices on behalf od the tobacco monopoly. The government has also provided a pumping boat which is tied up along the bank of the Mekong River to supply water for irrigation, the farmers themselves having dug the necessary ditches. The clear prospect is that a few acres of tobacco will soon multiply into a few hundred, and that the farmers' income will benefit accordingly. Other projects relate to village improvement. At larger villages, for example, the government has drilled deep well, provided pumps, built bath-and-laundry sheds, and encouraged the villagers themselves to build sanitary latrines on their own properties. The government has also started classes in which local boys and girls who have already finished primary school mar receive three months' training as seamstresses or barbers. At another village, the government has provided water for irrigation of vegetable gardens, land cultivated for the most part by the Thais, and maintained to look like model garden plots. Other projects relate to such matters as spraying with D.D.T. for mosquito control, the removal of livestock from their traditional quarters under the family dwelling into sheds at least a few yards distant, and the construction od small buildings for meetings of the local vigilante corps and other community organizations. Finally, the government has moved generally to reduce the control of Bangkok over local educational better and to encourage local school officials to exercise greater responsibility. This is a recognition of the fact that education in the Northeast remains deeply rooted in traditional patterns and that educational goals can be best realized when local people are given the responsibility for them. Symbolic of the trend is the establishment of a great, new university for the Northeast at Khon Kaen, "gate-way" to the region. It provides agricultural and vocational education for qualified young people in the Northeast and lessens the dependence of the Northeast on Bangkok for educational training. In the future, Khon Kaen University may be the leader in providing a better way of life for all the people of the Northeast. 1. The Peace Corps Another way in which the United States has been helping Thailand is through the Peace Corps. Developed originally by Senator Hubert Humphrey and the President John F. Kennedy, the program in Thailand has received a very warm welcome.47 By 1966, there were 356 Peace Corps volunteers working in Thailand. The first U.S. Peace Corps volunteers arrived in Thailand in 1962; there were forty-five volunteers then. They are stationed not only in the Northeast, but also in the other regions of the country. The Peace Corps programs in Thailand fall into three categories: 1 Rural Community Action. Since severe poverty is basically a rural problem in Thailand, all Peace Corps community action activities are in rural areas. The focus of the program is split between community development and public health. Both C.D. (Community Development) and Public Health volunteers work with village self-help programs. Long-range goals of community organization and a viable Thai government rural program are considered to be more important than special projects to meet immediate problems. Generally, no volunteer works on his own in a Thai rural development officials in district or provincial offices and assist Thai community development and public health workers in villages and rural health centers. Rural community action volunteers help improve links of communication between the Thai government and the developing rural areas. 2 Education. Education contributes directly to making the existing education system functioning, effective one. The Thais consider education to be a most important element in their pattern of development. Many schools exist, and the rate of literacy is about seventy percent, but the standards for education are not uniformly high. Thus teacher training is perhaps the most important long-range objective of the Peace Corps education program in Thailand. 3 Health Service. Much of the volunteer's time is spent in remote rural areas. Day-to-day activities include house visits and the conduct of health surveys. In malaria eradication, they work with Thai and A.I.D. officials collecting blood samples from suspected malaria victims, in the laboratory analysis of blood samples, add in spraying every structure with D.D.T. twice a year.48 No better indication can be found of the attitude of the Thai government toward the Peace Corps than the statement made by the former Thai Foreign Minister, Thanat Khoman. He said: . . . It is indeed striking that this important idea, the most powerful idea in recent times, of a Peace Corps, of a youth mingling, living, working with youth, should come from the mightiest nation on earth, the United States. Many of us who did not know about the United States thought of this great nation as a wealthy nation, a powerful nation, endowed with great material strength and many powerful weapons. But how many of us know that in United States ideas and ideals are also powerful? This is the secret of your greatness, of your might, which is not imposing or crushing people, but is filled with the hope of future good will and understanding.49 Volunteers also work in various agricultural programs, such as in swine and poultry extension programs. They also help with rural public works projects, such as providing feeder canals and farm ponds. They also assist in expansion of the present agricultural and community programs in Northeast Thailand.50 One of the newer programs for the Peace Corps in Thailand is in helping Thailand with its Mekong River Project. A total of seventeen men with degrees in agriculture, engineering, agronomy and soil science are working in a new high-priority program for Thailand. They are working in the Mekong basin, doing agricultural research and development and carrying on river development activities.51 Clearly the Peace Corps has been and is making a most valuable contribution to the welfare of the people of Thailand, especially in the Northeast where assistance is needed so badly. Chapter IV Thailand's Major Role in the Mekong River Basin Development and the Future of the Northeast Rural Development A. Introduction In undertaking this study of Northeast Thailand, no subject is probably of greater importance than the emergence, over the past two decades, of the Mekong River Project. In this chapter, an attempt will be made to trace the history and development of the Mekong work. The Mekong is the great river which flows along the border of the Northeast, and what takes place regarding the Mekong vitally affects the entire Northeast region. Even my small home-town village of Phon-thong in this Northeast will sooner or later feel the impact of the great new scientific and engineering developments on the Mekong. Many persons have pointed to the fact that no bridge has ever spanned the mekong, so powerful and broad is this river which begins in China and flows on down past Thailand (especially the Northeast), Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam into the South CHina Sea. Where the Mekong seemed unconquerable in the past centuries, today it appears about to come under the control of modern science and technology. The United Nations and its economic body in Asia, ECAFE (Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East), have taken the lead in bringing Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam into cooperation for the development of the Mekong. Some twenty-eight nations, including the United States, are now helping in the Mekong Project. The over-all goal of this planning is to develop the river so that it will materially improve the living conditions of millions of people in the four countries in the river's basin, namely, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam. B. Establishment The development of the Lower Mekong Basin began as early as the ninth century when the great Khmer emperors commenced the construction of an extensive irrigation system in the vicinity of Angkor. Recent improvement of the basin's area began in 1947 with the establishment of ECAFE. This organization provided the real stimulus for international cooperation in the Lower Mekong Basin.52 Water problems were given particular emphasis in ECAFE's early studies, and a number of conferences were held in the region to discuss these problems and water resources planning. The reports that resulted from the conferences and ECAFE's studies provided important guidelines for the planning and development that have since taken place. In 1949, ECAFE established a Bureau of Flood COntrol to advise and assist governments in Asia and the Far East on matters relating to floods and other water management problems. The Bureau was requested in 1951 to include international rivers in its investigations. It selected the Mekong for particular attention and enlisted the cooperation of the four riparians in undertaking the studies.53 C. Goals and Purposes The Mekong Development Project seeks the comprehensive development of the water resources of the Lower Mekong Basin, including mainstream and tributaries, in respect to hydroelectric power, irrigation, flood control, drainage, navigation improvement, water-shed management, water supply and related developments, for the benefit of all the people of Basin, without the distinction as to nationality, religion, or politics. Work toward this objective necessarily covers a wide range of activities from the definition of the coherent Basin Plan, to the investigation, construction, financing and management of individual projects. It seeks to catalogue the many component elements which together make up the Mekong River Project.54 D. Administrative Organization and the Members of the Mekong Development Committee The river basin planning is a highly complex process involving the collection and analysis of a large amount of data of the physical, economic, social and institutional factors that determine the opportunities for development. Planning is especially complex when several countries are involved because of differing view concerning the objectives that would be pursued. Until institutional mechanisms were available to coordinate and supervise the possibilities for development, the countries involved were not able to decide which studies needed to be undertaken and which projects should be developed. The Mekong Committee was formed to overcome such problems inherent in international river development.56 E. Planning of the Project 1. ECAFE Study--1952. The technical planning of the Mekong River Project began with the Ecafe study of 1952. It appeared in May 1952 as an eighteen-page document called "Preliminary Report on Technical Problems Relating to Flood Control and Water Resources Development of the Mekong--An International River."55 The study met with favorable responses for at least three reasons. Firstly,, the secretariat's response to the commission's request for the enquiry was prompt and efficient. Secondly, the project was interested in the problems of many Asian nations, thus giving it ann "international" and a regional flavor. Thirdly, and perhaps most important, the study cited the potential for tremendous benefits for all areas along the river. In particular it noted the possible development of firm power between Vientiane and Luang prabang, and the irrigation of the vast area of the Northeast of Thailand. The study called for further investigation and exploration, but according to Schaaf, ". . . political conditions intervened. Field surveys became impossible in many parts of the basin until the signing of the Geneva Accords in July, 1954."56 2. The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation Study--1956. After the Geneva Agreement in 1954, hostilities ended in Indochina and brought about a renewed interest in the possibilities of developing the Mekong River. This desire was expressed not only by the countries in the region, particularly through ECAFE, but also by other countries, especially France, Japan, and the United States. This interest resulted in a number of proposals for further studies to determine more precisely the problems to be solved and the opportunities for development. The first study after 1954 was undertaken by the United States Bureau of Reclamation under the sponsorship of the United States International Cooperation Administration. In 1955, representatives of the United States government conferred with officials of the four riparians on the possible plans. Their ideas were set forth in a basic document on the river's development.57 Because there was a great lack of basic data of the river and of activities in the basin, the Bureau made a number of recommendations relating to data collection programs, especially in connection with hydrology, meteorology, hydrography, topography, sedimentation, and geology. It also suggested the launching of studies on agriculture, fisheries, navigation and education. 3. The Wheeler Mission--1957. Meanwhile, interest in international river development in general, and in the Mekong RIver in particular, had grown at the U.N. A panel of experts was engaged to prepare a report on procedures for integrated river development planning for the development of the Lower Mekong.58 Encouraged by the offer of assistance from the United Nations, ECAFE undertook further investigations of the Lower Mekong Basin. In 1956, a team of seven experts, in cooperation with the four riparians, made a closer investigation of the basin's potentialities with respect to hydroelectric power, irrigation, and flood control. The group's report, published in October 1957, concluded that it would be possible to develop the river for a wide variety of purposes, and that such development ould be of immense benefit to the region.59 The report suggested there were especially attractive opportunities at five sites on the mainstream: Pa Mong, Khemarat, Khone Falls, Sambor and Toule-Sap. the development of projects at these sites, besides irrigating the vast areas of land, would produce some 32,000 million kwh of hydroelectric power per year at very low costs, and would reduce floods in the lower delta region. The report emphasized, however, that much more information and analysis would be required before the economic and technical feasibility of the contemplated schemes could be demonstrated. It noted the continuing lack of basic data on hydrology, meteorology, and geology, and called for the initiation of programs to remedy these deficiencies.60 The 1957 ECAFE report was one of the most important ones. It brought about close cooperation in planning and development among the nations sharing the basin, the basin's water, and its related resources. It also noted that international cooperation would be required not only in planning and development, but in basic data collection as well. In calling for formal collection of hydrologic and other data and in levelling and mapping, the report emphasized that: . . . the accuracy of such measurements should be beyond doubt, and . . . the figures should be acceptable of all countries concerned at all times.61 Adoption of the proposed international basin-wide approach, suggested in this ECAFE report, presented a major challenge. Besides calling for the close cooperation of the four riparians in data collection and planning and development function, it suggested the provision for marshalling assistance from elsewhere for the various studies and for the development of the projects that would emerge from these studies. The report also recommended, as a first step, the establishment of an international clearing house for exchange of information and plans, and for the coordination of projects. Shortly after the ECAFE report of 1957 was presented to thirteenth session of ECAFE, a meeting of representatives of the four riparian countries--Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand was held in Bangkok to consider further action.64 The meeting recommended the creation of a preparatory committee which would be composed of representatives of the four riparians. In September 1957, the Preparatory Committee, by its unanimous vote, adopted a permanent cooperative committee for investigation of the Lower Mekong Basin.62 The riparians, aware of the highly complex problems in connection with the collection and analysis of information on the physical, economic, and social aspects of the development of the river's resources, agreed to request expert assistance from the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration. It sought information on what type of data to be collected, what the collection programs would cost, and what priorities were to be assigned. Particularly, the committee wanted a review of previous studies and a detailed proposal for further action.63 The mission sent to Bangkok in late 1957 was headed by Lt. General Raymond Wheeler, formerly Chief of the United States Corps of Engineers, and included top level water resources development experts. The Mission's report was presented in early 1958. It indicated that the Mekong had impressive potentialities for multiple purpose development and recommend the establishment of a five-year program of investigations estimated to cost $9.2 million, and appointment of a high level international technical advisory board of engineers to assist the Mekong Committee. The Wheeler mission's specific recommendations relating to data collection included the following: 1) Establishment of hydrologic stations and levelling on the mainstream from the mouth to the Burmese border, as well as on the major tributaries; 2) Augmentation of meteorologic stations to provide data on precipitation and evaporation; 3) Programs of aerial photography and topographic mapping; 4) Hydrographic surveys of the mainstream to determine needed navigation improvements; 5) Reconnaissance of the major tributaries to identify sites meriting more detailed investigation; 6) Special studies relating to fisheries, agriculture, flood control, drainage, forestry, mineral resources, navigation, transportation, and power markets as well as an economic appraisal, projected for ten to twenty years, of how development would affect the area; 7) Surveys of flowage, damage likely to result in reservoir areas, surveys of construction materials, and soil survey; 8) Geologic investigations and boring at promising sites on the mainstream; 9) Preliminary planning of projects on promising stretches of the river.64 To some, the mission's recommendations seemed rather ambitious and far beyond the capacity of the countries involved. The latter, however, considered them a charter for action and immediately set about finding ways to implement them. Their enthusiasm spread abroad, and offers of assistance from many countries began to pour in. France had already offered sixty million francs to aid the committee's work. The United States offered $2 million to facilitate the establishment of hydrologic networks, levelling on the main river and major tributaries, and a hydrographic survey of the main channel. Canada agreed to undertake a program of aerial photography and mapping. Japan said it was willing to make a reconnaissance survey of the major tributaries. 4. The Ford Mission--1961. Since the inception of the plan to develop the Lower Mekong, there had been an awareness of the need for studies to determine what affects the development of the river might have on the economic and social structures of the population in the basin and what ancillary programs should be undertaken to ensure that the benefits of the river development would be fully realized. Several reports had indicated the importance of such studies but had offered few specific suggestions on what information was required, how easily it could be obtained, what priorities should be assigned in collecting it, and what type of institutional arrangements would be required to accomplish the aims and objectives of a comprehensive plan. In 1961, the Ford FOundation sponsored a mission headed by Gilbert F. White to make a survey of the economic and social needs._ The recommendations of the Ford Mission presented the Mekong Committee with a major challenge. The programs of studies would cost at least $15 million and would compete, to some extent, with other claims on the Committee's resources. Should it hold up some of the engineering investigations to carry out the economic and social studies, or should it try to garner additional assistance from other countries, international agencies, and private organizations? Fortunately, the Committee was able to pursue the latter course. The United States offered to produce an atlas of resources and to finance a systems analysis of possible projects. France agreed to undertake studies of local power demands, and resources. Resources for the Future, Inc., of Washington, D.C., offered to provide estimates of future world demands for aluminum. Other studies, such as industry surveys and regional power market surveys, were conducted by the ECAFE secretariat and the Mekong Committee secretariat. However, many of the proposed studies, particularly those on economic problems, have been delayed because of the lack of funds and because of unsettled political conditions. Military operations i the delta area, for example, retarded studies of the flood problems.69 5. Presidents Johnson's Statement at Johns Hopkins University-1967. President Johnson spoke at Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1967, in Shriver Hall Auditorium in Baltimore, Maryland. He said of the Mekong Project: . . . in a world darkened by clouds of discord, a flame of international cooperation burns with a promising light in Southeast Asia. It is the Mekong River Program. U Thant called it 'a very reassuring phenomenon' that could lead to 'easing of tensions' and even more. Will this unique bright spot flourish or fade out? The answer depends in large on part on a decision to construct a key mainstream (Pa Mong, N.E. Thailand) project. For ten years, the four riparian nations, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, and Thailand, have been working together on plans to develop the Lower Mekong, potentially SOutheast Asia's greatest natural resource. Actively aiding them are 27 nations, 12 specialized agencies of the U.N., three foundations and a host of private groups. Despite the armed conflict in Vietnam, preparatory work has continued. Now the outline of the mainstream project (Pa Mong) is at hand. . . . There must now be a much more massive effort to improve the life of man in that conflict-torn corner of our world. . . . The vast Mekong River can provide food and water and power on a scale to dwarf even our own T.V.A.65 He looked forward in this address to construction of dams across the Mekong to provide". . . electricity for the countryside . . . energy for industry . . . a rich harvest for its people."66 F. Thailand's Participation in the Mekong River Project The Mekong scheme will benefit Thailand as a whole and the Northeast in particular. Thailand, a son of the four riparian countries, is a member of the Mekong Committee. Two of the tributary dams already completed are in the Northeast of Thailand. Thailand will also benefit form the construction of the first mainstream project spanning the Thai and Laotian banks of the Mekong. The first of the Mekong Committee-sponsored tributary projects (a total of thirty-four tributaries have been surveyed) to be brought physically into being was the Nam Phung in Sakon-Nakhon (in the Northeast of Thailand). It was opened by the present King of Thailand on November 14, 1965. On March 14, 1966 by the opening, also by the King of Thailand, of the Nam-Pong project some fifty kilometers to the north of Khon Kaen, electricity from the power plant began being supplied to several provinces in the Northeast. By the end of August 1968, the Nam Pong (renamed the Ubol Ratana Hydroelectric Power Station) was supplying electricity to Vientiane and to the Nam-Ngum dam-site. In a few years' time, when the Nam-Ngum project in Laos is completed, Laos in return will be able to assist Thailand by supplying electricity to it.67 1. Northeast Thailand and its Projects. The Pa-Mong Dam is one of three mainstream projects which is in an advanced investigation stage and which would benefit mainly, Thailand.68 This is a project for the construction of a huge dam and water reservoir at Pa-Mong, Nongkhai, situated about fifteen miles upstream from Vientiane. This gigantic dam, with its head approximately 204 feet (the difference between upstream and downstream levels), will provide tremendous benefits for both Laos and Northeast Thailand. Schaaf stated that: It can produce annually an estimated nearly 10 billion kilowatt hours of firm energy from some 1.6 million kilowatts installed capacity and will improve upstream navigation for the length of its reservoir, i.e., about 210 miles. . . . Construction will mean that the present average low water discharge of about 23,300 cucecs can be increased to about 777,600 cucecs, which (after subtracting water diverted for irrigation) will add tremendously to the power production capacities of all downstream projects, substantially aid downstream navigation, and reduce salt-water intrusion in the delta. Floods deriving from typhoons crossing the peninsular about Pa-Mong will be completely absorbed.69 The potential Pa-Mong project in Laos and Thailand would certainly be a multipurpose water use and control project, with irrigation and hydroelectric power as principal functions. This mainstream Pa-Mong dam and its tributary dams on the Nam Lik River in Laos and Nam Mong in Thailand would provide primary storage, with the three dams forming essentially one larger reservoir. This three-dam complex could provide significant control of the Mekong River. However, ultimate development might include two secondary pump-storage reservoirs in the Nam-Pong basin and a diversion canal carrying water into a central basin via the upper hi River reservoir, in which case it would be possible to completely control the Mekong River at Pa-Mong, except perhaps for extremely high and unusual floods. It is hoped that irrigation will be provided to more than one million hectares of land in Northeast Thailand and Laos. Many incidental water uses would be served by the project, including flood control, navigation, fisheries, and domestic, industrial, and municipal water supplies.70 The Pa-Mong support study program provided for under the project agreement between the Mekong Committee and the United States Agency for International Development stipulated that the Mekong secretariat and the royal governments of Thailand and Laos would provide specific research and economic information upon which feasibility analysis would be made. This program would include agricultural economic studies of productivity levels, fertilizer and timing response in crop yields, crop labor inputs, crop yields crop management practices, land development costs, irrigated live-stock economy and marginal land use. Further, it was to include studies on benefits derived from flood control, navigation, fisheries, on domestic, municipal and industrial water supplies and, most importantly, on power. Considerable progress was made in 1980's towards the completion of these support studies, particularly in agricultural economics, fisheries, flood control benefits, and power.71 To meet the considerable need for a comprehensive and coordinated approach to agricultural development studies in the Pa-Mong project area, q working committee of Thailand and Laotian representatives, U.S.B.R. Pa-Mong staff, USOM/Thailand agricultural experts, and Mekong secretariat staff was set up in the second half of 1967. The group, after a field survey in the Pa-Mong project area (in which the Royal Thai government maintains more than one hundred agricultural research projects and stations), made a series of recommendations. In summarized form, these included: the need to ensure successful development in newly constructed irrigation projects in Northeast Thailand, such as Nam-Pong, Lam-Pao and Lam Pra-Ploeng; the need to disseminate the ability of reappraising the scope, functions and objectives of agricultural research in the Pa-Mong project area; the desirability of establishing effective coordination among agencies engaged in the planning and implementation of irrigation projects; and the need to train sufficient numbers of middle-level water management technicians.72 The Nam-Phong Dam is situated on a tributary which is located approximately thirty kilometers south-west of Sakhon Nakhon province. It was inaugurated by His Majesty, the King of Thailand, on November 14, 1965. Japan is responsible for its engineering design, and pedological investigations were made by France. Its irrigation capacity is 42,000 acres and generate up to 10,000 kilowatts of power. Its cost, five million dollars, was met by the Thai government because this project chiefly benefits Northeast Thailand. In 1966, the N.E.A. (northeast Electricity Authority) established the first pilot pumping stations, using power from the Nam-Pung to pump water from the Mekong River to irrigate a 500 hectare experimental farm. Based upon the success of this station, the N.E.A., in cooperation with the Department of Local Administration of the Ministry of Interior, embarked on a project to establish a pumping station along the Mekong River to irrigate some 4,000 hectares for the second rice crop or 8,000 hectares for upland crops, using power from the Nam-Pong and Nam-Pung projects. The Nam-Phung project supplies power to two provinces and four districts. The total electricity produced during 1967 was about six million kilowatt hours. Lam-Dom-Noi Dam-This dam project is located near Phibul Mangsahan in Ukon Ratchathani province. The National Energy Authority of Thailand, along with the cooperation of experts from the Electric Power Development Company of Japan (EPDC), made studies of it, and a joint report was completed in 1965. During 1966, SDGREAH, as part of the French technical aid program to the committee, carried out the agro-pedological survey of 30,000 hectares in the project area. After preparation of the detailed project report, a contract was signed with EPDC in July 1967 for the preparation of construction designs. Irrigation of about 25,000 to 30,000 hectares was proposed for development in the first phase and it was hoped that power could be supplied to the four provinces in the Mune Basin. Finally, the transmission system was designed to interconnect with the Nam-Phong and Nam-Pung power system.73 Nam-San Dam-After survey and mapping by the National Energy Authority of Thailand, the second phase feasibility investigation of the Nam-San tributary project was begun in 1966 with the assistance of the government of Austria. The project, located on a tributary of the Nam Heung and as presently envisaged would comprise a thirty-two-meter high dam and a power station, linked to the Northeast Thailand transmission system. The Austrian contribution of technical assistance brought to twenty-three the number of cooperating countries from outside the basin contributing to the Mekong Project. The Mekong Committee chairman and the member for Thailand expressed to Austria the committee's appreciation at the twenty-third session of ECAFE in Tokyo, Japan74 in April 1967. Nam-Phrom Dam-With the assistance of experts from the Electric Power Development Company (EPDC) of Japan, a feasibility report of the Nam-Phrom hydroelectric project was submitted to the Northeast Electricity Authority of Thailand for consideration in August 1967. The project proposed to impound the waters of the Nam-Phrom stream, a tributary of the Nam-Phong, by constructing a seventy-one meter high rock-filled dam with clay core creating a reservoir with an effective storage of 140 million cubic meters and a gross head of about 400 meters high. The cost of the project was estimated at 481 million baht (= $24 million). The cost of energy was assessed at 0.222 baht per kilowatt hours. The project report was under review by the Board of Directors of the Northeast Electricity Authority. Nam-Chern Dam-The preparation of the feasibility report on the Nam-Chern hydroelectric power project was entrusted by the Northeast Electricity Authority to EPDC of Japan in September 1967. Preliminary information available indicated that the project contemplated construction of a thirty-six meter high rock-fill dam with clay core creating a reservoir with an effective storage of about forty-one million cubic meters with a gross head of about 390 meters high on the Nam-Chern, a tributary of the Nam-Phong. The cost of the project, if independently implemented, was estimated at 180.7 million baht (= $9 million). If it were constructed after the completion of the transmission line from the Nam-Phrom project, the cost was estimated at 150.5 million baht (= $7 million). The unit costs of energy would be 0.324 and 0.25 baht per kilowatt hours respectively. Meanwhile, an access road to the dam site was constructed and additional geological investigation at the dam site and reservoir were under way.75 As mentioned before, the Mekong project will benefit Thailand as a whole and the Northeast of Thailand in particular. In the tributary project in the Mekong Basin, a total of thirty-four sites have been surveyed. The following are the tributary projects in Northeast Thailand at the present time: Pa-Mong Dam, Nong Khai Nam-Phong Dam, Khon Kaen Nam-Phung Dam, Sakon Nakhon Lam Dom Noi Dam, Ubon Lam Nam-Don Lam-Pao Lam-Phra-Phloeng, Khorat Lam-Takong Nam-Phrom Nam-Chern Nam-Sam Hui-Bang-Sai Nam-Mae-Ing Nam-Moon, Ubon. G. Future of the Mekong River Project Enough factual data has been presented here to show the imaginative and exciting character and the great potential of the Mekong Project. The Project has made much progress. But no one can afford, at this stage, to be overly optimistic. Some major problems still face it. Perhaps the largest one is finance: who is to provide the increasingly greater funding needed for the various Mekong undertakings? A second problem is the continuance of the war in the Indochinese peninsula, particularly now in Cambodia which makes cooperation with Communist Vietnam difficult. A third problem is leadership. The guiding spirit of the Mekong Project, Dr. C. Hart Schaaf, who is known as "Mr. Mekong," has been transferred by the U.N. to Ceylon, and his successor has yet to prove his leadership. For such reasons as these, there has been some slowing down in the work and planning of the Mekong Committee. But despite these difficulties, the Mekong idea is just too important to falter for long. The nations and peoples of the Mekong Basin have too much at stage to let the program slide back. Nowhere is the stake higher for the people than in the struggling Northeast of Thailand.76 In the 1980's, the success of the Mekong development project will contribute enormously to the development and well-being of the Northeast region of Thailand. While the area has soil less rich than central Thailand, it mainly lacks enough water at the right time to make it a rich rice-producing area or to permit it to grow other agricultural crops profitably. Rice-growing requires about seventy inches of rain a year, and the Northeast averages less than forty inches. The central Plain does not get seventy inches either, but it does receive more than the Northeast, and the plains make up the difference needed through an extensive system of irrigation canals which have been built over many decades. With the completion of the Mekong system, water for irrigation and new power will be available for the Northeast region. Even the small dam projects already completed have brought new irrigation to some acres and new power available to some areas. There is still much to be done over the years ahead, for this was planned as a long-range project. When finished it will harness the resources of one of the world's great rivers not only for the Northeast region of Thailand but for the benefit of several nations in Southeast Asia as well. . Chapter V The Northeastern Region's Rural Development And Its Political And Economical Struggles A. The Northeast's Search for Political Identity In 1932 Thailand had a major revolution led by two combined groups of civil servants and military. This revolution succeeded in overthrowing the Thai absolute monarchy and establishing a constitutional monarchy. It was the first time that the Thai people were able to express their political feelings and to participate in parliamentary democracy. The representatives from the Northeast during this time played an important role in both the nation and their home area. Through their efforts, they brought more attention to the Northeast region than this area had ever before experienced. In October 1933, when Phraya Phahon was Prime Minister, a royalist military leader, Prince Boworadet (a former Minister of Defense), led his troops from the Northeast (Khorat garrison) against the new government. However, the central government was able to defeat and disperse the rebellion.77 After Prince Bawardadet's rebellion, 3666 people were arrested and immediately jailed. They were accused of either joining the rebellion or of being Communists, or both. One of the prominent Northeast politicians, Nai Yuang Iamsila, was also charged with alleged left wing activity. He stated that he did not even know what a Communist was, and he was also one of the anti-Prince Bovonradet's group. The real reason for his activities was that he did not want Thailand to shift back to the old pre-parliamentary system again.78 Owing to this event, the Northeasterners tended to think that the central government was out not only to suppress their most prominent leader but also, generally, to limit and ignore the Northeastern activities. But despite such restraints on Northeast political activity, the Parliament created by the 1932 coup still provided an important forum for Northeast representatives in which to air some of their ideas Among the key leaders of the coup d'etat in 1932 were Phraya Phahon, Col. Phibunsongkhram, Nai Khuang Aphaiwong, and Dr. Pridi Pranomyong (Luang Pradit Manutham). Nai Pridi became one of the most important figures as the majority of the members of the Parliament grouped around him. He was the "brains" of the coup, and his ideas appeared in the constitution of 1932. He urged the nationalizing of both industry and farms, and making all employees workers for the state. His plan was banned by the government and he was forced to leave the country for a while.79 Although Pridi's economic plan was never again proposed formally, it was one of the proposals made by some of the Northeast representatives to solve the problems of the region. In 1934, Pridi returned to the country and became the Minister of Interior. His power and idea appeared to affect the young liberal group in the Promoters Group. His influence spread not only among a large number of elected representatives in the National Assembly, but also to others of what was seemingly the emerging elite, the students who attended Thammasat University (The University of Moral and Political Sciences), of which he was the founder and rector. Pridi's major adversary in the competition for political power was Phibun. His popularity increased when he led the forces which defeated Prince Boworadet's rebellion in 1933. Later, when he became Prime Minister, his military career and experience tended to dominate his leadership of the government. However, people rallied around him not because of his political ideas but because he had the power behind him. Pridi's ideas and leadership appealed to many of the Northeast representatives. They had relatively humble backgrounds and educations, but they were the most vocal type of Member of the Parliament with strong ties in the countryside of their constituency. Northeastern M.P.'s like Nai Thawil Udol (Roi-Ed M.P.), Nai Thong-In Phuriphat (Ubon), Nai Tiang Sirikhan), Nai Noi Thinnarat80 (Nakhon Ratchasima, Khorat), Nai Yuang Iamsila (Udorn province), and Nai Liang Chaiyakhan (Ubon province) were of this variety. Two possible reasons why such Northeast men committee themselves to the liberal Pridi faction are as follows: 1) Their political ideas were not based on who they knew in Bangkok, and (2) They were elected by the peasants. Therefore, to enhance their position they needed to dramatically expose both their plans and politics in such a way that they would increase their popularity with the upcountry people and bring them to the attention of the National Assembly. The political efforts of the Northeast leaders were to be interrupted to some extent when World War II broke out in Asia in 1941. Thailand now became a theatre of war, and Japanese troops began to occupy Southeast Asian countries, including Thailand. The Thai government became and ally of the Japanese. Pridi, with his followers (including some prominent Northeast M.P.'s), joined the Free Thai Movement with the anti-Japanese underground in Indochina. Though it is hard to document, it is believed that certain of the Northeast members of the Movement tried to tie their activities to Ho-Chi-Minh or Prince Suphanuwong.81 Among the Northeast politicians involved in the Free Thai Movement was a Roi-Ed representative, Nai Therwil Udol, who was sent as a representative to the Free Thai Movement. Other Northeastern M.P.'s who were involved in the Movement were Nai Chamlong Daoruang (representative from Mahasurakham), Nai Tiang and his brother, Nai Thiam Sirikhan (Sakonn Nakhon), Nai Thong-In and his brother, Nai Thim Phuriphat (Ubon), Nai Liang Chaiyakhorn (Ubon), and Nai Kwang Thongthawi (Kalasin). The last three were followers more of Nai Khuuang Aphaiwong than Pridi and later joined Nai Khuang in founding the Democrat Party.82 Later in the post-war period, as Pridi moved into stronger positions and eventually the Prime Ministership, the ties of various Northeast representatives with him continued to be close. Pridi developed the concept of a new Southeast Asia led by Thailand. Nuechterlein has written: Pridi had very definite ideas about the role that Thailand should play in Southeast Asian affairs. While maintaining good official relations with the victorious allies, particularly with the Untied States, Pridi also was ambitious for Thailand to become the leader of independent nations in this strategic area of Asia. He foresaw that nationalist forces in Burma, Indonesia, and Indochina would one day force the weakened colonial powers to recognize the futility of trying to rule these areas in the prewar manner, and that it was only a matter of time until the powers were forced to grant them independence. Pridi believed that . . . Thailand's long history of independence and political stability and its success in dealing with European powers made it a natural leader among these emergent nations: It was an ambitious vision but Pridi was an extraordinary person who seemed to have unlimited faith in his ability to lead Thailand and Southeast Asia in the new postwar era. . . . 83 In order to achieve his goal, Pridi proposed that Bangkok become the city in which the conflicting powers of Southeast Asia could meet and settle their differences. In May 1947, he formed a Southeast Asia Union, composed of Southeast Asian nations including Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam as free and independent states. After approximately three months, however, the Union faded into oblivion.84 In September 1947, when Indonesian nationalists were suppressed by the Dutch, Pridi attempted the formations od another union and the Southeast Asia League were extremely interesting in that it showed the close relationship between the leaders of the Independent Movement in Indochina. The president, Nai Tiang Sirikhan (M.P. from Sakhon Nakhon) and the public relations officer, Nai Thawin Udol (a former M.P. from Roi-Ed) were both well known Northeast political leaders. The vice-president, Tran Van Giao, and treasurer, Le Hi, were important figures in the Viet Minh, and the general secretary, Prince Suphanuwong, was to become the leader of the Pathet Lao. The other two Thai officers of the league were Nai Manot Watthiya (assistant secretary) and Nai Sukhit Nimmanhemin, who was the librarian, and now--in 1970--is the Minister of Education of Thailand.85 The League lasted only two months. During this time Pridi was pursuing his desire to make Thailand a significant power among Southeast Asian countries, but events within the country had greatly undermined his position. Pridi's interest in foreign affairs was matched by his growing concern for domestic political power. In MArch 1946, riding on the crest of his World War II record as leader of the Free Thai, he became Prime Minister. He was never to realize his full potential in this key position, for on June 1946, a great tragedy occurred in Thailand: the young king, Ananda Mahidon just back from his studies in Switzerland, was found shot in the palace. Though no one has ever proven that Pridi was involved, the country was rifle with rumors about his possible involvement. In the circumstances, he found it wise to resign, and in 1947, he fled the country, continuing to be in exile to the present time. Those Northeast leaders who had supported Pridi now found themselves in a most awkward situation. During 1946-1947, many of them were arrested and put under close surveillance.86 In the middle months of 1948, some major Northeast leaders who had been hiding in the country for a period of time, gradually reappeared and were immediately arrested and confined. For example, Nai Tiang Sirikhan (Sakhon), Nai Chamlong Doaruang (Mahasurakham), Nai Thong-In Phuriphat and his brother Thim (Ubon), and Nai Thawin Udol (Roi-Ed), along with another Pridi follower from the Central plains, Dr. Thong Phaeo Cholaphum (from Nakhon Nayok), were arrested and charged with plotting a separatist movement in which the Northeast would be joined to Indochina in a Communist-dominated Asia Union. Of this, John Coast has written: Nai Tiang Sirikhan, himself a leader and a person of great prestige in the Northeast, denied the pro-Communist charge while quite openly admitting his sympathy with the aim of forming some sort of Southeast Asian Union, though not one that would infringe upon Siam's sovereignty. Many Laotians, while not wishing to cut themselves loose from Siam, felt that the administration of the Northeast was too feebly controlled from Bangkok, and that greater local autonomy was essential for proper administration.87 In February 1949, Phibun's government was seriously shaken by an attempted counter coup by Pridi-led forces. After this attempt, a number of Free Thai leaders were found dead of mysterious gunshot wounds in their homes. The elimination of these men had a lasting effect in the Northeast area. In March 1949, Nai Thong-In, Nai Chamlong, and Nai Thawil, along with Dr. Thongphaeo Chonlaphum, were re-arrested in spite of the fact that they had been released just a short time before. B. The Emergence of Northeast Regionalism Shortly after Nai Thong-In, Nai Chamlong, Thawil and Dr. Thong Phaeo were arrested on March 4, 1949, they were shot to death by the police while "attempting to escape" at a road-marker north of Bangkok (Bangkhen). It is generally known as the Kilo 11 incident.88 No details were given in any of the cases. Four of these men had been prominent in the anti-Japanese underground during the war. Nai Thong-In Phuriphat was former Minister of Industry (from Ubol), Nai Chamlong Daoruang (from Mahasarakham) was former member Deputy Commerce Minister, Nai Thawil Udol was a former member of the House of Elders and Dr. Thongphae Cholaphum was the former Deputy Finance Minister from Nakhon Nayok, in the Central region.89 . . . The official story was that the four men were being transferred by bus to another prison, when suddenly a rescuing party of their friends fired on the bus, killing the prisoners and missing the escorting policemen.90 The death of these prominent Northeastern leaders was a major catalyst in stirring the Northeast regional political and cultural feeling. The incident spurred the idea of regionalism, with few believing the government official news releases that the prisoners were shot by Communist terrorists from Malaya who were trying to help them escape. The prisoners had been chained and placed firmly in the cars.91 From March through May 1949, both Nai Thim Phuriphat and Nai Tiang Sirikham were brought to trial and charged with plotting the Northeast separation. They were finally released, perhaps because of public outrage about the Kilo 11 incident. For Nai Tiang Sirikhan the respite was temporary. In 1949 and 1952, while still under indictment, he campaigned and was reelected in his province of Sakhon Nakhon. In December 1952, the newspapers reported he had escaped to Burma to evade arrest in conjunction with a new plot by conspirators.92 He never again appeared and many people thought that he had been killed under government order by Police-General Phao Sriyanond in Karnchanaburi province.93 Some of the major Northeast M.P.'s had increased contact with government. Nai Thep Chotinuchit was one. He was the son of a lawyer official and had an unusually varied career. He received his degree in law and economics at Bangkok and began working with the government. In 1937 he was appointed judge and ten years later was elected as the M.P. from Sisaket, in the Northeast. From 1949-1951 he was Deputy Minister of Commerce in the Phibun government.94 C. The National Economy and the Northeast Seasonally, between harvests and planting time, large numbers of Northeastern peasants came to Bangkok seeking temporary work in order to support themselves or their families back home.95 At most, they would spend only a few years in Bangkok before returning to settle permanently in their villages in the Northeast. Most of them came offering only their unskilled labor. They worked at many different kinds of jobs, such as pedicab drivers (until pedicabs were banned inn 1960), construction workers, or workers in various Chinese-operated mills and factories. They found that they were generally viewed ass inferior by urban Thai, and were only employed in lowly occupations. They also discovered that Bangkok Thai thought of them as unsophisticated and uncultured upcountry people. Because of these attitudes, they tended to congregate among themselves, drawn by a common sub-culture dialect, and similar tastes for food and music.96 In Bangkok, the Northeastern sector of the labor force emerged as a relatively distinctive lower-class group, whose organization and desires were utilized to advantage by some Northeast members of the Parliament. Skinner states: There is, in fact, considerable evidence that a Thai lower class is emerging (in Bangkok) with common interests and class consciousness. Low in possession of most values important in Bangkok society, the class is primarily concerned with basic well-being, i.e., the health and safety of the organism. Some elements within the class, pedicab drivers, for instance, are formally organized for the attainment of group interests, while others, domestic servants and market gardeners, for example, . . . are informally organized. The class has been wooed by some Thai politicians in hopes of support at the polls. The fact that a large proportion of this class consists of recent immigrants from up-country, especially Northeast Thailand, provides a natural basis for some working arrangement with Assemblymen representing the provinces in question.97 Because of their experiences in Bangkok, when the Northeasterners returned home, they carried with them the feelings of class and ethnic discrimination directed toward them as Northeasterners by the Central Thai inhabitants of Bangkok. They also had an enhanced awareness of the common culture and problems which all Northeasterners share. This was noted particularly between 1947 and 1957 (Field Marshal Phibun's second period in power), with many representatives from the Northeast region playing upon a growing sense of regionalism, and pressuring the Central government to direct more attention toward the Northeast. The objective which these members of Parliament promoted in behalf of their regional constituency was the reduction or elimination of alleged discrimination by the national government toward the Northeast. They charged that Bangkok ignored, and even suppressed, the Kilo 11 incident as well as the disappearance off some outstanding Northeast politicians. The government also failed to stimulate development in the Northeast so the region could attain the same economic level as the rest of the country. Finally, they maintained that the central government, and Central Thai inhabitants in general, treated Northeasterner as cultural or class inferiors.98 Late in 1952, after the disappearance of one of the most prominent Northeast M.P.'s (Nai Tiang Sirikhan from Sakhon Nakhon), Nai Thep Chotimechit from Sisaket became a major figure in the leftist revival in 1955-1958. He emerged as an important opposition leader. The developing strength of the Northeast-led opposition was apparent in the 35 out of 240 votes which Nai Thep received in the election for President of the Thai Assembly by M.P's of both appointed and elected categories.99 Although political parties were banned shortly after the opening of the Assembly, some opposition continued to flourish under the leadership of Thep and another Northeastern deputy, Nai Klao Noraphati of Khon Khaen.100 Some of the Northeast M.P.'s began to advocate a neutralist foreign policy in contrast to the pro-American policy of the government. In reaction to the neutralist position of the opposition, the government accused its leadership of subverting national interests. General Phao, Phibun's Chief of Police, accused Thep and his followers of being allied with the Viet Minh, Pathet Lao, and Red Chinese leadership in mainland CHina. Thep formerly served as Deputy Minister of Commerce. His primary interest was in the economic development of the upcountry such as the Northeast province.101 In July 1953, Thep proposed a bill to legalize political parties in accordance with a provision in the 1952 constitution. It was defeated by the pro-government group on the strength that it would pave the way for the Communists to organize a political front in Thailand. Shortly after, he introduced another bill proposing that village chiefs should be elected instead of appointed by the government, Again and again Thep, the leader of the Economist Party, and his followers attacked the government. It brought him face to face with General Phao. On one occasion, after a serious confrontation with General Phao, he declared that Thailand was a democratic country and should listen to various opinions and not force the people to be silent. He then led the opposition party members in a walkout. This event embarrassed General Phao and prompted him to say: "Let we warn Thep to be careful. I am democratic and anti-Communist."102 In 1955, Phibun continued to lead Thailand on what he thought was the road to democracy. He decided on the dissolution of the Parliament and the holding of elections for a new one. Three political party groupings appeared: the pro-government (Seri Manangkasila and Associated Parties) led by Phibun; the old Democratic Party led by Khuang Aphaiwong; and a group of small parties which represented various shading of what was called Thailand's new left. The most important of these small parties were the Economic (Setthakorn) and the Free Democratic (Seri Prachathipatai), founded and led by M.P.'s from the Northeast.103 Not all of the Northeast leaders were in the opposition. It is interesting to note that Nai Liang Chaiyakarn (from Ubol) was the leader of the pro-government Seri Manangkhasila Party in the Northeast. He spent more time in the Assembly than any other Northeast M.P. and moved through different political parties such as Democratic, pro-Pridi and even pro-Phibun. Another prominent Northeast M.P., Nai Fong Sitthitham, also joined the Democratic Party (from Ubol). But Nai Thep Chotinuchitt was still the leader of the opposition Economic Party along with Nai Thim Phuriphat. In 1956, both Thep and Thim made a trip to Communist China without sanctions from the government. On their return, they were arrested but released shortly thereafter. They sought to put more emphasis on internal economic problems than on foreign policy in their attempt to win support for the Economist Party. Thep's Socialistic Front had five outstanding points: . . . first, to develop the economy with proper planning--'it calls for a planned economy,' he said later, 'beneficial to the producer and the middleman and the consumer. We cannot simply cut off the middlemen, who after all are Thai citizens who have a place in the national economy'. Secondly, to ensure justice to capitalists, people with ability and the laborers--'We still have need of capitalists; we shall get rid of them later.' Thirdly, to use most of the budget for the happiness of the people. Fourthly, to abrogate all laws against the rights of the people, i.e. the Anti-Communist Act. And finally, to repeal all unjust taxes. As for foreign policy, it would be 'neutral and independent', accepting only unconditional aid. . . .104 The other major leftist parties were the Free Democratic Party founded by Nai Sang Morungkum (from Buriram) and the Hyde Park Movement, led by Nai Thawisak Triphi, from Khon Khaen. However, it was the Economist Party of Thep which was most influential in the Northeast. It won more seats (eight) under Phibun's election than in the free elections at the end of 1957 (only six). They were all in the Northeast. For a year Thep led the parliamentary assault against the West; then he and his followers were arrested under martial law. They were taken to jail, where they spent some time.105 After the February 1957 election, the government was accused of rigging the election results. People and students demonstrated against the government. The situation was getting worse and worse when Marshall Sarit Thanarat resigned from the government (he was at that time Minister of Defense). In September 1957, Sarit led a military coup d'etat which forced Phibun and Phao into exile.106 However, Sarit himself did not full control the government right away. He went abroad to seek medical treatment in the United States and England. Therefore, from September 1957 until October 1958 two of Sarit's supporters, Nai Pote Sarasin (from September 1957 to January 1958 and then General Thanom Kittikachorn (from January to October 1958), served as Prime Ministers. During this period considerable political freedom existed in the country. In October 1958, Sarit returned and inaugurated a new period of military rule. D. The Northeast and Thailand's Quest for National Security Marshal Sarit's coup in 1957 returned military dictatorship to Thailand and the National Assembly was no longer an outlet for expressions of Northeast regionalism. But Sarit's rise to power was not to be without its benefits to the Northeast. Although information on the number is unavailable, his government absorbed many upwardly mobile Northeasterners. Sarit himself was half Northeasterner. His father, Major Thong di Thanarat, was a district officer in Nakhon Phanom province. His mother, Mrs. Charnthip (Thanarat) Chanthasakha, was a native of Nakhon Phanom province. Mr. Sanguan Chanthasakha, his step-brother, was an M.P. (1957-1958) and later governor of Nakhon Phanom. Sarit obtained all of his education in Bangkok. Perhaps as an ex-Northeasterner he occasionally recalled his regional past in government. during this time, the government moved more directly than ever before to pay more attention to the Northeast and to provide it with new and major assistance. The pro-government leaders in the Northeast called for four major steps: 1. An urgent short-term project to improve conditions in the Northeast should be started in order to relieve suffering and hunger there as soon as possible. 2. The government should draw up a long-term project like the Yankee Hydroelectric Project (renamed King Phumiphol in the North), using foreign loans as in the Central and Southern projects. 3. The government should establish heavy industries in the Northeast which has plenty of raw materials. 4. The government should increase educational facilities in the Northeast.107 It was obvious that, though the Northeasterners of various parties had different ideas (such as the Pridi-followers, the anti-Communist group, the Neutralists, or those favoring relations with Communist China), they all shared the common object of seeking the improvement of the Northeast region. E. The Impact of Communist Pressures from Laos and Vietnam in the Northeast In the 1980's, pressures from the Communist forces in Laos and Vietnam are still to have a great impact on events in the Northeast. The current crisis in Laos and Cambodia in 1980's and after the fall of South Vietnam to Communist North Vietnam in April 1975, brought serious matters to Thailand. She appeared threatened from both internal and external forces.108 To trace back the Communist threats to Thailand earlier around the end of 1961, the Thai government made two raids which resulted in numerous arrests of alleged Communist agents and supporters in several of the Northeastern towns. The biggest of these raids was in December of 1961 when over a hundred suspects were arrested in Udon and Sakon Nakhon. The government found out that those arrested were recruiters of villagers to the cause of Communist Separationists who wanted to effect secession of the Northeast from the rest of the country.109 The government also claimed that these arrests were a follow-up to the arrest of a former pro-government M.P. from Sakon Nakhon, Nai Khrong Chanhawong, who had earlier been executed as a Communist leader. Also in the December raid, the police engaged in the first battle between government forces and indigenous Communists in Nakhon Phanom province. ALthough stressing that those captured were Northeasterners, the government alleged that the suspects had been trained by and were under orders from the Pathet Lao. Fears of a tie-in between a suspected Northeastern Liberation Movement and the Pathet Lao were suggested by the formation of a Thai exiles group composed of some M.P.'s from the Northeast in Xieng Khoung, Laos. One reporter claimed that this group was plotting to take the Northeast out of Thailand and join it to Laos at a later date.110 As a result of these increasing threats to the Northeast, the government launched a whole series of new programs for the Northeast, and cooperation with the United States was intensified to strengthen this region. The rapid change of events in the region showed not only a tremendous change in the attitude of the people of the Northeast, who were formerly firmly socialist and neutralists in political sentiment. It showed that the Northeasterners, probably as a result of improved cultural, economic and educational opportunities, were capable of independent thought and were beginning to evidence concern over the pressures of the Communists on their villages and towns and way of life. The matter of developing the Northeast takes an added importance in the light of security factor. This has become increasingly sensitive in the last fifteen years, since the Geneva Conference of 1954 granted independence to the former French state of Indo-China. Since then, there have been continuing efforts by Communist forces supported from Laos, North Vietnam, and Communist China to stir up discontent among the Thai villagers of the Northeast, who are often remote and sometimes isolated from the mainstream of thai society, represented by Central Thailand and symbolized by metropolitan Bangkok. In circumstances of this kind, the villager's loyalty is usually first of all to their local community. If their loyalty extends beyond the village, it is to the region in which their village is located, and only in some vague distant manners is there apt to be loyalty to the Thai nation as a whole. Recognizing this situation and the fact that the overwhelming majority of Northeasterners are Thai-Loa ethnically and a majority are Thai-Khmere, the Communists have tried to destroy any inchoate loyalties the Northeasterners have to Thailand and to redirect them to Laos. They have had little so far in directing these loyalties to Laos in general or more specifically to the Communist cause represented by the Pathet Loa. Although supplied with propaganda, as well as weapons, and equipment from across the Mekong River, and using tourist tactics in some villages similar to those in the Vietnam War in the early stage of that conflict, the Communists have won few dedicated supporters. At the beginning of the 1970's up to early 1980's, the number was estimated by different sources at five thousand in a population in the Northeast of about 17 million. In early 1980 the government estimated that they were about 10,000 communist insurgents operating in the country.111 Of this number, approximately 3,000 were thought to be in the North; 5,000 in the Northeast; 2,5000 in the South; and the remaining 500 in the Central provinces. It has always been difficult to estimate with any accuracy the number of Thai inhabitant who support or sympathize with the armed insurgents, and the approach followed by I.S.O.C. (Internal Security Operational Command), the Thai Military's Supreme Command which was established in 1974. I.S.O.C.'s mission currently remains as the integral agency to coordinate all military, police and civil counter insurgency operation throughout the country. Guerrilla incidents initiated by the Thai People's Liberation Army (T.P.L.A.) showed a steady annual rise after 1974 until early 1980's when they diminished significantly in the Northeast. Foreign analysts familiar with the C.P.T's (Communist Party of Thailand) background have reported that the leadership of the central committee in early 1980 has been suffering from a less than unanimous approach to the insurgency that has accompanied the growing dispute between China and Vietnam.112 Details of study of internal security and potential external threats from communist insurgent and the problem of rural development inn the Northeast will be presented in chapter VI. Chapter VI The Problems of Internal Security, External and Communist Threat in the Northeast Region A. Introduction During the late 1970's and mid 1980's the problems of neighboring countries, such as Laos and Cambodia aroused considerable concern in the Thai government in regards to the matter of internal security. This concern was centered principally on the question of the susceptibility of the population in the Northeast region to Communist-directed subversion. The conception of the threat was that of a build up of a cadre structure for the organization of a guerrilla war against the government. The leadership of this effort was presumed to be based in areas of Laos controlled by the Pathet Lao. The fundamental appeal of the subversive movement was alleged to be a call to separate the Northeastern provinces from Thailand and join them to a Communist Laos. It is a fact that Communist efforts have shifted from urban groups such as workers, students, and intellectuals to farmer. Such a shift would indicate an effort aimed toward rural rebellion. During late 1963 and early 1964, rumors circulated on the Hong Kong money markets that China was using scarce American dollars and other hard currencies to purchase millions of baht, the Thai currency. It was thought that China planned to finance an expanded subversive effort in Thailand. The rumors seemed to be substantiated in the early 1965 when China announced the establishment, with permanent representation in Peking, of a "United Patriotic Front of Thailand" and a "Thailand Independence Movement."113 At the same time, reports from Thailand's Northeast, traditionally the scene of much banditry, pointed to a marked rise in political terrorism. Assassination of police agents, school teachers and others who represented the government went up sharply in 1965 according to the Thai government.114 By early 1966, the terrorists themselves announced that over 150 reactionary forces had been wiped out in Sakhon Nakhon province, and while this is probably much exaggerated (official sources would admit to just 20 killings for that period), the curve of political murders was rising. By mid-1966, 70 incidents were recorded, at least double the number of the last months of 1965, and in marked contrast to 1962, when only two or three political killings were reported to have taken place.115 Two warnings immediately should be noted. The first is that, for many reasons, reliable figures regarding these incidents are not to be had, and, second, that it would be misleading to blame all the terrorism in Northeast Thailand on Communists. The people in the Northeastern bulge, whose patterns of trade, language, and popular culture tie them to Laos rather than Central Thailand,116 also are relatively poorer than other Thai, and they have an important historical political separatism and opposition to the central government inn Bangkok. For these reasons, Thai and other observers have for some years been saying that Bangkok should do something about the Northeast. This has been true especially since 1962, when it became clear that parts of neighboring Laos might be in a close relationship to Communists North Vietnam, and it has been feared that Thai insurgents could reasonably expect support from outside. This, combined with the poverty of Northeast, and its history of social protest and local rebellion, seemed to place the region in an especially vulnerable position. The problem of the Northeast is not, therefore, simply one of Communist instigated subversion, but rather one of present day Communist exploitation of long-standing features of society and politics in Thailand over the years, such as poverty and illiteracy among the mass of common people. Nevertheless, it is clear that Communists, both in China and Vietnam, do support the increasing subversive efforts, which so far have concentrated in four provinces. These are Udon, Sakhonakorn, Ubon and Nakorn Phanom, regions where American forces are also to be found. Parenthetically, this poses at least two additional problems. First, the visible American presence may support claims that the Thai government has sold out to America117 , and second, it is more difficult to protect bases when they are located in areas of the Northeast subject to terrorism. The more immediate problem, however, is that the classic pattern of village intimidation is taking place in parts of the Northeast where little or no security exists. B. Communist Threat in the Northeast Region In the mid-1960's, Northeast Thailand was properly considered an area of strategic importance in the conflict in Southeast Asia. The course of public affairs was dominated by the shifting winds to the east in the successor states to French Indochina. Within these developments, the possibility of profound changes in both the internal and external politics of the country may be perceived. In January of 1953, Peking proclaimed the creation in South CHina (Yunan province) of a Thai autonomous people's government, whose purpose was said to guide other neighboring Thai-speaking people in the struggle against "Western Imperialist: oppression. Although most of the Thai people had fled south into the Indochinese peninsula during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries in the wake of the military defeat by the Mongol lords of China, some had remained behind and become incorporated into the Chinese empire. By this new pseudo Pan-Thaism, the Chinese obviously were creating yet another instrument with which to promote the shattering of contemporary Thailand. The Chinese Foreign Minister, Mr. Chen Yee, declared that Thailand was on the list as a target for Communism. He said, "We hope to have a guerrilla war in Thailand before the year is out" in 1965.118 BY the end of 1964, Thailand had come in indirect contact with Communist operations. Now for the first time, Peking and Hanoi opened an active campaign against the Thai government, and Thailand became a target of Communist attacks originating abroad as well as within the country. The attacks began with an appeal by the Communist Party of Thailand (C.P.T.) to the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Peking. The C.P.T. asked for the formation of a patriotic, democratic, and united front to work against the Thai government and its AMerican backers. Subsequently, a "Thailand Independence Movement" was formed in December 1964. The aim of the movement was to "wage a struggle against United States aggression," make Thailand a genuinely "neutral"nation, and to overthrow the "reactionary" Thai central government and replace it with a "progressive" and democratic" regime.119 Furthermore, Communist CHina intensified its activity in Thailand by organizing yet another subversive organ. In February 1965, a Thai Patriotic Front was created to supplement the "Thai Independence Movement." In its manifesto, the Patriotic Front proclaimed its firm resolution to drive out AMerican imperialism and also to expel the reactionary government of Thailand. A report from Hong Kong said that Communist agents had brought one million dollars worth of Thai currency to be used for bribery and other clandestine operations. These activities only indicated one thing: that the Communists were ready for a second operational front in Asia. After the establishment of the Thai Independence Movement and the Thai Patriotic Front,a marked increase in Communist Activity was noted in Northeastern Thailand. Apprehension grew that the Communists would seek to use all means to undermine the Thai government control of the area. Furthermore, the Communists also had another group among which to stage subversive acts in the Northeast. The Vietnamese minority of about 50,0000 were susceptible to their propaganda. Although the International Red Cross had arranged the repatriation of some 9,000 Vietnamese to North Vietnam in recent years, the arrangement had been frustrated by Hanoi's refusal to cooperate. It is believed that Hanoi wanted to keep their nationals in the Northeast as a convenient source of support for future Communist operations. Acts of terrorism continued to be perpetuated in the Northeast. In early 1965, the Thai government announced the arrest of Communist suspects. More than fifty persons were captured. At the same time, the Communists carried out liquidation campaigns against policemen, school teachers, and police informers. In November 1965, in clash between the border police and the Communists, twenty-four police agents were killed. Later, the border police patrol was able to seize Chinese and Bulgarian weapons and ammunition. The police also found Communist documents and literature in both the Northeast and in abandoned camps somewhere near Malaysia. It was the first time that the Communists moved out from their secure camps and began propaganda activities. the simultaneous border aimed to place Thailand in the middle of a Communist vice. After the Communist insurgency started in 1964, the number of murders notably increased. The assassination of police agents, village head-men, and school teachers increased from six persons in 1964 to thirty in 1965. In 1966, it was estimated that there was a monthly average of ten assassinations of government supporters by the Communists. By early 1967, the assassination rate rose to fifteen in February and one a day after March 1, 1967.120 More and more, it was clear that the Communists were waging a guerrilla war in Thailand. Hitherto, Communist activities had been on a small scale, but the guerrillas were now getting themselves better organized. One technique of the Communists was to hold meetings among villagers in remote area. Here they appealed for support and promised the villagers a better life under a Communist regime. They also passed out leaflets and propaganda materials. Though in 1967 the guerrillas were not engaged in a large scale war or extensive sabotage, they continually made their presence felt. It is estimated that there were between 600 and 1,000 guerrillas inn the Northeast. These guerrillas were under the leadership of the Thai Patriotic Front, which had merged with the Thailand Independence Movement by the end of 1965.121 This merger was a major step by Peking to intensify its Communist insurgency in Thailand. The Communist-supported Front was headed by a former Thai Lieutenant Colonel named Phayom Chulanon. Lt. Col. Phayom was a member of the National Assembly in 1948. He fled Thailand after an unsuccessful coup attempt in 1949. In 1958, he ran for re-election to the National Assembly but failed. After the late Premier Sarit Thanarat, the extreme conservative anti-Communist, took over in the early 1960's, all Communist-supported Front figureheads in Thailand, such as Lt. Col. Phayom, Nai Prasert Sarp-Sunthorn and their followers fled the country. Lt. Col. Phayom finally went to Peking and remained their to organize the Communist Front. Late in the 1960's to the mid 1970's the insurgency increased steadily. On July 24,1978, about 300 COmmunist guerrillas attacked a military base in Northeast Thailand, killing 5 soldiers and wounding 16 others.122 But the government's efforts had resulted in some success in the Northeast by 1968, which allowed in a shift in attention to the North, and the South where activists had opened a new front. There, armed insurgents attacked villages and elements of the paramilitary Border Patrol Police (B.P.P.) in the mountainous provinces of Chinag Rai and Nan located to the South and east of the intersection of the Thai, Burmese and Laotian borders. Insurgency also became an active security concern in the South, especially after the summer of 1968, when dissidents staged ambushes and held propaganda meetings in isolated villages along the Thai-Malaysian border.123 Signs of the stepped-up offensive were visible everywhere along the few good highways in the remote provinces. While driven by theories, however, it is generally known that the government considers counterinsurgency to be the close collaboration between the police and civilians and not the armed forces. In practice, military authorities are still in charge. On April 18, 1982, however, a government spokesman reported that, at least 40 soldiers were killed and more than 200 wounded, in the last two months of this year.124 In the 1980's armed insurgency, a national problem that plagued a series of Thai government and dominated police and army activities for the preceding 15 years, continued to threaten the Thai's political stability. The Communist Party of Thailand appealed especially to people of the Northeast, including both Thai-Lao and non-Thai minorities, and of the south region. In May and June 1973 the civilian political elite came together with student workers in opposition to and dissatisfaction with the dictatorial regime. This opposition mounted in the Universities, labor organization as well as among rival military factions. Opponents demanded a more democratic constitution and authentic parliamentary elections. Early in October 1973, there was renewed violence, protesting the detention of eleven students arrested for handing out anti-government pamphlets. The demonstrations grew in size and scope as students demanded an end to the military dictatorship. On October 13th, 1973, more than 250,000 people rallied in Bangkok, the largest demonstration of its kind in Thai history, to press their demands against the government. The demonstrations in October 1973, originally were not intended as the prelude to revolution. The student union was given full credit for bringing down the military dictatorship. In the democratic period 1973-1976, mass participation in political activity, unknown before in Thai history, had become commonplace, as had the bloodshed that attended it. On October 6, 1976, in the midst of turmoil, a group of twenty-four officer in the high military command, led by the then commander in chief, Admiral Sangat Chaloyu, toppled the democratic regime. The experiment with democratic government that had been born out of the violence of October 15, 1973 was brought to an end in similar violence in October 6, 1976. Tough measures were enforced by the Military government under martial law to suppress opposition. Hundreds and thousands of suspects, intellectuals, students, people and journalists, were rounded up for questions and their domiciles were searched. Many fled, however, before they could be arrested, and others joined insurgent groups sponsored by the illegal Communist Party of Thailand (C.P.T.). In 1980's the NSCT(National Student Center of Thailand), once-touted phenomenon of student power appeared to have faded from the national scene. C. The Counter-Insurgency The developments in Thailand's Northeast and the Front's activity may be compared of the early stages of the Vietnam War. Communist insurgency in the area was on the pattern of the Viet-Cong movement in South Vietnam in 1958. It appeared that the Thai Patriotic Front intended to serve a role similar to that of the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam, the political organ of the Viet-Cong. In the year 1965, when the Northeast turned into an area for Communist insurgency, the United States proposed a plan to transform the Thai Army into a more effective anti-guerrilla force. American experts in guerrilla warfare were dispatched to the country to train Thai units in anti-Communist activities. With United States training, help and equipment, the border police were expanded to 6,800 men and provincial police to 32,300, or a total increase of fifteen percent.125 By the end of 1966, the U.S. Army Special Forces, the Green Berets, were stationed in the Northeast and they opened three training camps for Thai infantrymen. The United States were prepared to increase military aid to Thailand owing to the increased threat of Communist insurgency. By the end of 1966, American military aid approximated thirty million dollars worth of supplies and equipment. The trouble in the Northeast was originally treated by the Thai government as being primarily the concern of the police. However, when the number of assassinations rose to an alarming point, the Thai government began to move army battalions into the area. In an intensive two week drive, the Thai police, aided by army troops, killed more than one hundred Communists and arrested five hundred suspected guerrillas, Some two thousand villagers who had been under Communist domination surrendered to the police. In the Northeast, Radio Peking and Hanoi are widely received by villagers. They are supplemented by a clandestine radio broadcast which calls itself the "Voice of the Thai People." This illegal broadcast is believed to originate somewhere in North Vietnam or in Communist-held area of Laos. In recent years, there has been a step-up in the radio propaganda against Thailand. It often called for a revolution against the Thai government and denounced American imperialism. In January 1966, the "Voice of the Thai People" celebrated the first anniversary of the Thai Patriotic Front by announcing that "the present, immediate, and urgent talk is to give all means of support wholeheartedly to the armed struggle by our compatriots in the Northeastern and the other regions of the country."126 The "Voice of the Thai People" is broadcast in the dialect of the Northeast. Furthermore, radio Thailand in Bangkok and stations in other cities are not powerful enough to reach the area. Therefore, the United Sates supplied a portable radio transmitter to the government to help counter the "Voice of the Thai People." The United States also agreed to give Thailand a one thousand kilowatt radio station replacing the fifty kilowatt radio station of Thailand. The new radio station is called the "Voice of Free Asia," and is a counter to Communist radio stations in Peking and Hanoi. Within the past few years, under the Thai government, the Depa